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Negotiated Reform (eBook, PDF) - Campus Verlag
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Campus Verlag:

Negotiated Reform (eBook, PDF) - neues Buch

2014, ISBN: 9783593433004

ID: 3cb5a0c72f66f0b4d90e573c414712df

1 Introduction: Regulatory Reform in a Multilevel Action System The reform process The near-collapse of financial markets in 2008, generally perceived as a global crisis, has widely been attributed to the failure to properly regulate a financial system that had undergone international expansion and become increasingly autonomous. Surprised and shocked by the crisis and its threatening economic impact, politicians focused first on crisis management, but soon there appeared to be agreement that comprehensive regulatory reform was needed. Reform initiatives were launched at all political levels, national, European, and international. Given the nearly global expanse of the financial system, it was obvious that these various initiatives should be coordinated. At the time of the crisis, there existed no coherent governance structure that would have made possible a coordinated, international response to the regulatory challenge. Regulatory competences were concentrated at the national level. The EU had largely refrained from using its legislative powers for the purpose of market shaping rather than for market making, its dominant goal. At the international level, there existed a number of separate bodies of different types (see Baker 2009), but no treaty-based organization to regulate international finance. This is in stark contrast, for instance, to the international trade regime, where the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a recognized international authority. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a classic international organization, but its mandate is to assist countries in danger of default, rather than to regulate financial markets. International financial regulation was instead based on "soft" law standards designed by transnational networks of national regulators (Verdier 2013: 1405-1406). These international standardization bodies - the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) - depend on voluntary compliance with the rules they develop. In addition, there were international deliberative bodies such as G7, G10 and G20, where mainly the finance ministers and central bank governors of a limited number of countries meet to discuss emerging financial market problems. Finally, there were two platforms with loosely defined functions of coordination: the Joint Forum for the coordination of work by the standard setters and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) that was to promote collaboration and information exchange among the different bodies dealing with financial regulation and stability. This fragmented international governance structure was the result of developments that took place after the end of the Cold War; they are more closely analyzed in Chapter 2 of this volume. Given the extreme time pressure, a general overhaul of the regulatory structure prior to starting regulatory reforms was out of the question, so the task was shouldered by already existing authorities and standard-setting institutions. But it was evident that some form of coordination, both internationally and across political levels, was necessary if the crisis was to be overcome and a repeat of it prevented. The reform process that started at the same time at the different political levels had a substantive and an organizational aspect. At the national level, there was a flurry of disparate regulatory interventions in immediate response to the crisis, and there were also changes in the regulatory structure, although their nature and extent varied considerably between countries. In Germany, for instance, a shift of competences from the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) to the German central bank was discussed, but not enacted in the end. In contrast, substantial organizational reforms were initiated and finally realized in the United States and the United Kingdom, the two Anglo-Saxon countries in which deregulation of financial markets has been most pronounced. In both countries, competences were shifted and new agencies were created.1 Organizational change also took place at the level of the EU, where a new agency, the European Systemic Risk Board, was created, while the three previously existing committees that were supposed to coordinate national supervisors were transformed into European supervisory agencies. These agencies have some decisionmaking power and the competence to intervene under certain conditions in areas so far under exclusive national jurisdiction (Figure 1-1). Institutional change at the international level was least evident. No new agencies were established, nor were existing bodies given the competence to make binding decisions for lower level jurisdictions and market actors. There were, however, changes in the mandate, composition, and weight of some agencies in the overall process of regulation. The G20 had been established in 1999 as a lowkey body of central bank governors and finance ministers (who rarely attended in person) to discuss financial matters. In 2008, the G20 heads of government themselves started to meet at highly publicized summits, thus transforming the G20 into the "premier forum of our international economic cooperation" (G20 2009b). The Financial Stability Forum that had mainly served as information broker also changed substantially. Transformed into the Financial Stability Board (FSB), it has since worked closely with the G20. The IMF was given additional resources. Among the standard setters, the BCBS quickly assumed a focal role in the reform process because stricter capital requirements had quickly become a central reform demand. Figure 1-2 shows the international governance architecture as it had developed by 2010, and as it still looks today.2 By the middle of 2011 there had thus been a - limited - upward shift of de facto regulatory power, and an (even more limited) upward shift of formal competences in the multilevel governance of financial markets. Because legislative competence is still concentrated at the national level, this upward shift has meant that the downward connection between levels has also become more important. The G20 summits have strongly voiced the need for specific reforms and have "tasked" international organizations, as well as national and regional jurisdictions, to become active. The standards formulated by international bodies, notably the BCBS, have served as a template for EU decisions and have also shaped regulatory decisions taken by non-EU countries. EU member states, expecting a new or amended EU directive, often put off introducing new rules by themselves. National decisions were affected by higher level demands and rulings, but national actors were active in formulating these very demands and rulings. By virtue of these upward and downward connections, the policy-making process had become, if not more centralized, more international, and activities at different political levels became more closely linked. Reform demands voiced after the outbreak of the crisis were radical and comprehensive. At the second G20 summit meeting in London in 2009 the assembled heads of government proclaimed: "We have agreed that all systemically important institutions, markets, and instruments should be subject to an appropriate degree of regulation and oversight" (G20 2009a). Similarly comprehensive reform demands were voiced by the Stiglitz Commission of the UN (United Nations 2009) and the OECD (2009). Banking regulation was to become stricter, rules were to be extended to cover previously unregulated components of the financial system, and regulatory standards were to be harmonized or at least coordinated at the international level in order to make regulatory arbitrage unattractive. Financial market reform quickly became the object of research, by political scientists and political economists alike. The crisis had been a "big bang", and radical regulatory change appeared to loom. At the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG) an international group of researchers was formed in 2010 to study the reform initiatives undertaken at the international and the European level, and by selected individual states. This collective research enterprise was concluded in the summer of 2011; the results were published in Mayntz (2012). By this time it had become obvious that, contrary to early demands for radical reform, regulatory change would be neither comprehensive nor internationally coordinated. As had to be expected, reform plans met with the resistance of the powerful financial industry, but politicians themselves were careful not to strangle a financial system whose functioning was considered essential for the economy. The reforms adopted by the summer of 2011 were admittedly insufficient to discipline risk taking by financial institutions, to deal with the problem of moral hazard presented by banks deemed to be "too big to fail", and to counter the threat of domino effects resulting from the high degree of interconnectedness among market actors. At this stage in the reform process the international financial market crisis was superseded by the European sovereign debt crisis and the related euro crisis. When the attention of political leaders and international organizations turned towards the new issues of sovereign debt, currency problems and economic recession, this had to affect financial reform and in particular banking reform efforts in one way or another. The financial crisis had been a banking crisis; the sovereign debt crisis again involved banks, but now the banks were not the culprits. Banks had been chided for issuing high-risk "subprime" mortgages on a large scale, and for investing heavily in risky securitized mortgages; now they were urged to continue giving credit to the productive economy and to buy government bonds of highly indebted states. The relationship between politics and the finance industry appeared to be reversed: political authorities bent on disciplining financial institutions suddenly found themselves in the position of petitioner. This shift in the balance of power between prospective regulators and the objects of regulation could conceivably have brought the regulatory reform process to a standstill in the fall of 2011. In fact, however, regulatory reform did not come to a standstill. What initially may have appeared to impede a concerted regulatory response - namely the fact that the reform task devolved upon the incoherent set of already existing institutions involved in some way or other in financial market regulation - now worked in favor of a continuing reform process: Once activated by the financial crisis, these institutions simply continued in their job. Overall, the reform process triggered by the financial crisis has a clear timeprofile, moving from the earlier emphasis on bankers' excessive risk-taking and insufficient bank capital to more complex issues, such as the moral hazard posed by increasingly global financial institutions that were deemed "too big to fail" and the threats posed by the unregulated "over-the-counter" trading of complex derivatives. Although the financial crisis had put financial regulation on the political agenda, politicians lacked knowledge of the structure and dynamics of the financial system. Unsurprisingly in this situation, and despite the fact that the crisis was quickly seen as a macro-prudential, systemic problem, the reform approach was micro-prudential at first, targeting individual banks, and the financial incentives that encouraged bankers to engage in increasingly risky trades. Higher capital requirements were another easily understandable measure against risk-taking by banks. Because bank runs threatened, increased deposit insurance was called for and enacted, and consumers - typical small investors - were supposed to receive better information about the risks attendant on specific investments. Measures addressing over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets and systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) started later. The reform process has also remained selective, if judged against a complete model of the factors contributing to the financial crisis. The agenda for financial market reform was set at the very beginning and has not been significantly revised, let alone extended when attention shifted to different problems. The initial reform discourse has defined the issues to be dealt with by the FSB and international standard-setting organizations, by the European Union, and by individual governments. Potential reform topics that were not on this agenda have not been taken up. One might mention in this regard issues of taxation, the liability of bankers for the consequences of bank activities, and complex forms of securitization, so-called innovative financial instruments (including assetbacked securities [ABS], collateralized debt obligations [CDO], CDO-squared, and credit default swaps [CDS]). The only tax measure discussed - off and on - at various levels, although without a chance of finding international approval, is the so-called "financial transaction tax". Bankers have been held to account for knowingly selling "toxic" securities to unsuspecting customers, but not for the damage caused by risky policy decisions. In addition to the resistance of the financial industry, the complexities of legislation may have inhibited reforms in taxation and liability. The regulation of innovative financial instruments was confronted with the fact that the use of "innovative" forms of securitization was considered to be useful for investors, and not only profitable for banks. The specific selectivity of financial market reform will evidently limit any salutary effects.The questions Financial market reform is an ongoing process; it started in another century and will continue, if something similar to our current type of society survives, into the next. The earlier MPIfG project on the reforms triggered by the financial crisis broke off before the process had run its course. By now, however, the reform process has achieved something like an intermediate outcome. In the Communiqué of the Brisbane G20 summit in November 2014, the heads of governments proudly proclaim: "We have delivered key aspects of the core commitments we made in response to the financial crisis. [?] The task now is to finalise remaining elements of our policy framework and fully implement agreed financial regulatory reforms" (G20 2014: 2). It is therefore feasible to treat the reform decisions that took place between 2009 and November 2014 as, [PU: Campus, Frankfurt am Main]

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Negotiated Reform - Campus Verlag
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Campus Verlag:

Negotiated Reform - neues Buch

2008, ISBN: 9783593433004

ID: 90125369

Haben die von der Finanzkrise betroffenen Nationalstaaten die auf internationaler Ebene ausgehandelten Regelungen übernommen? Oder haben sie im Gegenteil die europäische und die internationale Reformagenda bestimmt? Trägt die Politikentwicklung in einem politischen Mehrebenensystem zur internationalen Harmonisierung der Finanzmarktregulierung bei? Oder dominieren unterschiedliche nationale Interessen den Prozess? Eine international zusammengesetzte Gruppe namhafter Sozialwissenschaftler beleuchtet in diesem Buch das Zusammenspiel internationaler, europäischer und nationaler Entscheidungsprozesse bei der Reform der Finanzmarktregulierung. 1 Introduction: Regulatory Reform in a Multilevel Action System The reform process The near-collapse of financial markets in 2008, generally perceived as a global crisis, has widely been attributed to the failure to properly regulate a financial system that had undergone international expansion and become increasingly autonomous. Surprised and shocked by the crisis and its threatening economic impact, politicians focused first on crisis management, but soon there appeared to be agreement that co eBook eBooks>Fachbücher>Politikwissenschaft, Campus Verlag

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Negotiated Reform - Campus Verlag
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Campus Verlag:
Negotiated Reform - neues Buch

2008

ISBN: 9783593433004

ID: 90125369

Haben die von der Finanzkrise betroffenen Nationalstaaten die auf internationaler Ebene ausgehandelten Regelungen übernommen? Oder haben sie im Gegenteil die europäische und die internationale Reformagenda bestimmt? Trägt die Politikentwicklung in einem politischen Mehrebenensystem zur internationalen Harmonisierung der Finanzmarktregulierung bei? Oder dominieren unterschiedliche nationale Interessen den Prozess? Eine international zusammengesetzte Gruppe namhafter Sozialwissenschaftler beleuchtet in diesem Buch das Zusammenspiel internationaler, europäischer und nationaler Entscheidungsprozesse bei der Reform der Finanzmarktregulierung. 1 Introduction: Regulatory Reform in a Multilevel Action System The reform process The near-collapse of financial markets in 2008, generally perceived as a global crisis, has widely been attributed to the failure to properly regulate a financial system that had undergone international expansion and become increasingly autonomous. Surprised and shocked by the crisis and its threatening economic impact, politicians focused first on crisis management, but soon there appeared to be agreement that eBook eBooks>Fachbücher>Politikwissenschaft, Campus Verlag

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Negotiated Reform - Campus Verlag
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Campus Verlag:
Negotiated Reform - neues Buch

2008, ISBN: 9783593433004

ID: 888fb693ceb6a1e91afb8849374ef3bc

1 Introduction: Regulatory Reform in a Multilevel Action System The reform process The near-collapse of financial markets in 2008, generally perceived as a global crisis, has widely been attributed to the failure to properly regulate a financial system that had undergone international expansion and become increasingly autonomous. Surprised and shocked by the crisis and its threatening economic impact, politicians focused first on crisis management, but soon there appeared to be agreement that Haben die von der Finanzkrise betroffenen Nationalstaaten die auf internationaler Ebene ausgehandelten Regelungen übernommen? Oder haben sie im Gegenteil die europäische und die internationale Reformagenda bestimmt? Trägt die Politikentwicklung in einem politischen Mehrebenensystem zur internationalen Harmonisierung der Finanzmarktregulierung bei? Oder dominieren unterschiedliche nationale Interessen den Prozess? Eine international zusammengesetzte Gruppe namhafter Sozialwissenschaftler beleuchtet in diesem Buch das Zusammenspiel internationaler, europäischer und nationaler Entscheidungsprozesse bei der Reform der Finanzmarktregulierung. eBooks / Fachbücher / Politikwissenschaft, Campus Verlag

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Negotiated Reform - Renate Mayntz
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Renate Mayntz:
Negotiated Reform - Erstausgabe

2015, ISBN: 9783593433004

ID: 33635427

The Multilevel Governance of Financial Regulation, [ED: 1], Auflage, eBook Download (PDF), eBooks, [PU: Campus Verlag]

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