ISBN: 9783640407484

This paper discusses the reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of the obligations of the Ankara Agreement [AA] and the Additional Protocol [AP] in successive Turkish governments. Th… Mehr…

This paper discusses the reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of the obligations of the Ankara Agreement [AA] and the Additional Protocol [AP] in successive Turkish governments. The analysis is built on the premise that Turkey-EU relations face i) a credibility problem and ii) an anchoring problem. It will be shown that Turkey`s undertakings in the AA and the AP have been non-credible. Not only has Turkey failed to converge towards the EU trading regime because of the Turkish government`s sensitivity to pressure from the private sector, but also because the Turkish government itself had less incentive to comply with the tariff dismantling process. Turkey`s tardy convergence policy was to a wide extend driven by the goal of reducing the costs of its European orientation. For a systematically distinct approach to the analysis, the paper is divided into four different sections. After the introduction, which illustrates the methodology of this approach in comparison with former attempts, the private sector and its role in the deviation creating process from the AP driven by the fear of short term convergence expenses will be briefly analysed. The ensuing section, which points out the failures in implementing the provisions given by the AA and the AP, is divided into three stages. The first stage demonstrates that demands for modification of the AA and the AP will not be met if society assertiveness is not sufficient enough in the second stage we will prove the opposite, and in the third stage we will show that given the previous facts, which are one source of Turkey`s credibility problem in its membership bid, the EU is not willing to play a fully fledged anchoring role. The last section discusses the findings of the aforementioned steps. The European Union and Turkey: Society Assertiveness and Credibility Lack: This paper discusses the reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of the obligations of the Ankara Agreement [AA] and the Additional Protocol [AP] in successive Turkish governments. The analysis is built on the premise that Turkey-EU relations face i) a credibility problem and ii) an anchoring problem. It will be shown that Turkey`s undertakings in the AA and the AP have been non-credible. Not only has Turkey failed to converge towards the EU trading regime because of the Turkish government`s sensitivity to pressure from the private sector, but also because the Turkish government itself had less incentive to comply with the tariff dismantling process. Turkey`s tardy convergence policy was to a wide extend driven by the goal of reducing the costs of its European orientation. For a systematically distinct approach to the analysis, the paper is divided into four different sections. After the introduction, which illustrates the methodology of this approach in comparison with former attempts, the private sector and its role in the deviation creating process from the AP driven by the fear of short term convergence expenses will be briefly analysed. The ensuing section, which points out the failures in implementing the provisions given by the AA and the AP, is divided into three stages. The first stage demonstrates that demands for modification of the AA and the AP will not be met if society assertiveness is not sufficient enough in the second stage we will prove the opposite, and in the third stage we will show that given the previous facts, which are one source of Turkey`s credibility problem in its membership bid, the EU is not willing to play a fully fledged anchoring role. The last section discusses the findings of the aforementioned steps., GRIN Verlag<

ISBN: 9783640407484

This paper discusses the reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of the obligations of the Ankara Agreement [AA] and the Additional Protocol [AP] in successive Turkish governments. Th… Mehr…

This paper discusses the reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of the obligations of the Ankara Agreement [AA] and the Additional Protocol [AP] in successive Turkish governments. The analysis is built on the premise that Turkey-EU relations face i) a credibility problem and ii) an anchoring problem. It will be shown that Turkey`s undertakings in the AA and the AP have been non-credible. Not only has Turkey failed to converge towards the EU trading regime because of the Turkish government`s sensitivity to pressure from the private sector, but also because the Turkish government itself had less incentive to comply with the tariff dismantling process. Turkey`s tardy convergence policy was to a wide extend driven by the goal of reducing the costs of its European orientation. For a systematically distinct approach to the analysis, the paper is divided into four different sections. After the introduction, which illustrates the methodology of this approach in comparison with former attempts, the private sector and its role in the deviation creating process from the AP driven by the fear of short term convergence expenses will be briefly analysed. The ensuing section, which points out the failures in implementing the provisions given by the AA and the AP, is divided into three stages. The first stage demonstrates that demands for modification of the AA and the AP will not be met if society assertiveness is not sufficient enough in the second stage we will prove the opposite, and in the third stage we will show that given the previous facts, which are one source of Turkey`s credibility problem in its membership bid, the EU is not willing to play a fully fledged anchoring role. The last section discusses the findings of the aforementioned steps. The European Union And Turkey: Society Assertiveness And Credibilit: This paper discusses the reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of the obligations of the Ankara Agreement [AA] and the Additional Protocol [AP] in successive Turkish governments. The analysis is built on the premise that Turkey-EU relations face i) a credibility problem and ii) an anchoring problem. It will be shown that Turkey`s undertakings in the AA and the AP have been non-credible. Not only has Turkey failed to converge towards the EU trading regime because of the Turkish government`s sensitivity to pressure from the private sector, but also because the Turkish government itself had less incentive to comply with the tariff dismantling process. Turkey`s tardy convergence policy was to a wide extend driven by the goal of reducing the costs of its European orientation. For a systematically distinct approach to the analysis, the paper is divided into four different sections. After the introduction, which illustrates the methodology of this approach in comparison with former attempts, the private sector and its role in the deviation creating process from the AP driven by the fear of short term convergence expenses will be briefly analysed. The ensuing section, which points out the failures in implementing the provisions given by the AA and the AP, is divided into three stages. The first stage demonstrates that demands for modification of the AA and the AP will not be met if society assertiveness is not sufficient enough in the second stage we will prove the opposite, and in the third stage we will show that given the previous facts, which are one source of Turkey`s credibility problem in its membership bid, the EU is not willing to play a fully fledged anchoring role. The last section discusses the findings of the aforementioned steps., GRIN Verlag<

2003, ISBN: 9783640407484

This paper discusses the reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of the obligations of the Ankara Agreement [AA] and the Additional Protocol [AP] in successive Turkish governments. Th… Mehr…

This paper discusses the reasons for the unsuccessful implementation of the obligations of the Ankara Agreement [AA] and the Additional Protocol [AP] in successive Turkish governments. The analysis is built on the premise that Turkey-EU relations face i) a credibility problem and ii) an anchoring problem. It will be shown that Turkeys undertakings in the AA and the AP have been non-credible. Not only has Turkey failed to converge towards the EU trading regime because of the Turkish governments sensitivity to pressure from the private sector, but also because the Turkish government itself had less incentive to comply with the tariff dismantling process. Turkeys tardy convergence policy was to a wide extend driven by the goal of reducing the costs of its European orientation. For a systematically distinct approach to the analysis, the paper is divided into four different sections. After the introduction, which illustrates the methodology of this approach in comparison with former attempts, the private sector and its role in the deviation creating process from the AP driven by the fear of short term convergence expenses will be briefly analysed. The ensuing section, which points out the failures in implementing the provisions given by the AA and the AP, is divided into three stages. The first stage demonstrates that demands for modification of the AA and the AP will not be met if society assertiveness is not sufficient enough, in the second stage we will prove the opposite, and in the third stage we will show that given the previous facts, which are one source of Turkeys credibility problem in its membership bid, the EU is not willing to play a fully fledged anchoring role. The last section discusses the findings of the aforementioned steps. Wissenschaftlicher Aufsatz aus dem Jahr 2003 im Fachbereich Politik - Int. Politik - Thema: Europäische Union, Note: unbenotet, Bogazici Üniversitesi., [PU: Grin-Verlag, München]<

ISBN: 9783640407484

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